Noem v. Vasquez Perdomo (2025)

Supreme Court of the United States

No. 25A169

Kristi Noem, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security, et al. v. Pedro Vasquez Perdomo, et al.

On Application for Stay

[September 8, 2025]

The application for stay presented to Justice Kagan and by her referred to the Court is granted. The July 11, 2025 order entered by the United States District Court for the Central District of California, case No. 2:25–cv–5605, is stayed pending the disposition of the appeal in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and disposition of a petition for a writ of certiorari, if such a writ is timely sought. Should certiorari be denied, this stay shall terminate automatically. In the event certiorari is granted, the stay shall terminate upon the sending down of the judgment of this Court.

Justice Kavanaugh, concurring in the grant of the application for stay.

I vote to grant the Government's application for an interim stay pending appeal of the District Court's injunction.

The Immigration and Nationality Act authorizes immigration officers to "interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be or to remain in the United States." 66 Stat. 233, 8 U. S. C. §1357(a)(1). Immigration officers "may briefly detain" an individual "for questioning" if they have "a reasonable suspicion, based on specific articulable facts, that the person being questioned . . . is an alien illegally in the United States." 8 CFR §287.8(b)(2) (2025); see United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 884 (1975); United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002). The reasonable suspicion inquiry turns on the "totality of the particular circumstances." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 885, n. 10; Arvizu, 534 U. S., at 273.

The Government estimates that at least 15 million people are in the United States illegally. Many millions illegally entered (or illegally overstayed) just in the last few years.

Illegal immigration is especially pronounced in the Los Angeles area, among other locales in the United States. About 10 percent of the people in the Los Angeles region are illegally in the United States—meaning about 2 million illegal immigrants out of a total population of 20 million.

Not surprisingly given those extraordinary numbers, U.S. immigration officers have prioritized immigration enforcement in the Los Angeles area. The Government sometimes makes brief investigative stops to check the immigration status of those who gather in locations where people are hired for day jobs; who work or appear to work in jobs such as construction, landscaping, agriculture, or car washes that often do not require paperwork and are therefore attractive to illegal immigrants; and who do not speak much if any English. If the officers learn that the individual they stopped is a U.S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, they promptly let the individual go. If the individual is illegally in the United States, the officers may arrest the individual and initiate the process for removal.

Immigration stops based on reasonable suspicion of illegal presence have been an important component of U.S. immigration enforcement for decades, across several presidential administrations. In this case, however, the District Court enjoined U.S. immigration officers from making investigative stops in the Los Angeles area when the stops are based on the following factors or combination of factors: (i) presence at particular locations such as bus stops, car washes, day laborer pickup sites, agricultural sites, and the like; (ii) the type of work one does; (iii) speaking Spanish or speaking English with an accent; and (iv) apparent race or ethnicity.

The Government contends that the injunction will substantially hamper its efforts to enforce the immigration laws in the Los Angeles area. The Government has therefore asked this Court to stay the District Court's injunction.

To obtain a stay from this Court, the moving party must demonstrate a fair prospect that, if the District Court's decision were affirmed on appeal, this Court would grant certiorari and reverse. The moving party also must show a likelihood that it would suffer irreparable harm if a stay were not granted. Those two factors are the "most critical." Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 434 (2009). Particularly in "close cases," the Court also considers the balance of harms and equities to the parties, including the public interest. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 558 U.S. 183, 190 (2010) (per curiam); see Nken, 556 U.S., at 435.

In my view, the Government has made a sufficient showing to obtain a stay pending appeal.

To begin with, given the significance of the issue to the Government's immigration enforcement efforts, this Court would likely grant certiorari if the Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's injunction. See, e.g., United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670 (2023); Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785 (2022).

In addition, on two alternative grounds, the Government has demonstrated a fair prospect of reversal of the District Court's injunction.

First, under this Court's decision in Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), plaintiffs likely lack Article III standing to seek a broad injunction restricting immigration officers from making these investigative stops. In Lyons, the Court held that standing to obtain future injunctive relief does not exist merely because plaintiffs experienced past harm and fear its recurrence. What matters is the "reality of the threat of repeated injury," not "subjective apprehensions." Id., at 107, n. 8. So too here.

Plaintiffs' standing theory largely tracks the theory rejected in Lyons. Like in Lyons, plaintiffs here allege that they were the subjects of unlawful law enforcement actions in the past—namely, being stopped for immigration questioning allegedly without reasonable suspicion of unlawful presence. And like in Lyons, plaintiffs seek a forward-looking injunction to enjoin law enforcement from stopping them without reasonable suspicion in the future. But like in Lyons, plaintiffs have no good basis to believe that law enforcement will unlawfully stop them in the future based on the prohibited factors—and certainly no good basis for believing that any stop of the plaintiffs is imminent. Therefore, they lack Article III standing: "Absent a sufficient likelihood" that the plaintiffs "will again be wronged in a similar way," they are "no more entitled to an injunction than any other citizen of Los Angeles; and a federal court may not entertain a claim by any or all citizens who no more than assert that certain practices of law enforcement officers are unconstitutional." Lyons, 461 U.S., at 111; see Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l USA, 568 U.S. 398 (2013); Application 16–22; Reply 4–9.

Plaintiffs' standing theory is especially deficient in this case because immigration officers also use their experience to stop suspected illegal immigrants based on a variety of factors. So even if the Government had a policy of making stops based on the factors prohibited by the District Court, immigration officers might not rely only on those factors if and when they stop plaintiffs in the future.

Second, even if plaintiffs had standing, the Government has a fair prospect of succeeding on the Fourth Amendment issue. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873; Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266; Application 22–30; Reply 9–14.

To stop an individual for brief questioning about immigration status, the Government must have reasonable suspicion that the individual is illegally present in the United States. See Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 880–882; Arvizu, 534 U.S., at 273; United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989). Reasonable suspicion is a lesser requirement than probable cause and "considerably short" of the preponderance of the evidence standard. Arvizu, 534 U.S., at 274. Whether an officer has reasonable suspicion depends on the totality of the circumstances. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 885, n. 10; Arvizu, 534 U.S., at 273. Here, those circumstances include: that there is an extremely high number and percentage of illegal immigrants in the Los Angeles area; that those individuals tend to gather in certain locations to seek daily work; that those individuals often work in certain kinds of jobs, such as day labor, landscaping, agriculture, and construction, that do not require paperwork and are therefore especially attractive to illegal immigrants; and that many of those illegally in the Los Angeles area come from Mexico or Central America and do not speak much English. Cf. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U. S., at 884–885 (listing "[a]ny number of factors" that contribute to reasonable suspicion of illegal presence). To be clear, apparent ethnicity alone cannot furnish reasonable suspicion; under this Court's case law regarding immigration stops, however, it can be a "relevant factor" when considered along with other salient factors. Id., at 887.

Under this Court's precedents, not to mention common sense, those circumstances taken together can constitute at least reasonable suspicion of illegal presence in the United States. Importantly, reasonable suspicion means only that immigration officers may briefly stop the individual and inquire about immigration status. If the person is a U. S. citizen or otherwise lawfully in the United States, that individual will be free to go after the brief encounter. Only if the person is illegally in the United States may the stop lead to further immigration proceedings.

In short, given this Court's precedents, the Government has demonstrated a fair prospect of success both on standing and Fourth Amendment grounds. To conclude otherwise, this Court would likely have to overrule or significantly narrow two separate lines of precedents: the Lyons line of cases with respect to standing and the Brignoni-Ponce line of cases with respect to immigration stops based on reasonable suspicion. In this interim posture, plaintiffs have not made a persuasive argument for this Court to overrule or narrow either line of precedent, much less both of them.

The Government has also demonstrated that it would likely suffer irreparable harm if the District Court's injunction is not stayed. As the Court has indicated, "'"[a]ny time" '" that the Government is "'"enjoined by a court from effectuating statutes enacted by representatives of its people, it suffers a form of irreparable injury."'" Trump v. CASA, Inc., 606 U.S. ___, ___ (2025) (slip op., at 25) (quoting Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301, 1303 (2012) (Roberts, C. J., in chambers)).

So it is in this case, particularly given the millions of individuals illegally in the United States, the myriad "significant economic and social problems" caused by illegal immigration, Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S., at 878, and the Government's efforts to prioritize stricter enforcement of the immigration laws enacted by Congress. Notably, moreover, the District Court's injunction threatens contempt sanctions against immigration officers who make brief investigative stops later found by the court to violate the injunction. The prospect of such after-the-fact judicial second-guessing and contempt proceedings will inevitably chill lawful immigration enforcement efforts. On the two most critical factors, therefore, the Government has demonstrated that a stay is warranted. Turning then to the balance of harms and equities: As with many other applications for interim relief to this Court, the harms and equities may appear weighty on both sides. In those circumstances, to borrow Justice Scalia's apt words from a different context, trying to determine whether one party's harms or equities outweigh another party's can be akin to "judging whether a particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy." Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment). Moreover, in a case like this involving government action, balancing the harms and equities can become especially difficult and policy-laden. That is because a court must balance the harms to the regulated and negatively affected parties not only against the harms to the Government as an institution, but also against the harms to the third parties who otherwise would benefit from the challenged government action. Cf. Nken, 556 U.S., at 436.

In any event, the balance of harms and equities in this case tips in favor of the Government. The interests of individuals who are illegally in the country in avoiding being stopped by law enforcement for questioning is ultimately an interest in evading the law. That is not an especially weighty legal interest.

To be sure, I recognize and fully appreciate that many (not all, but many) illegal immigrants come to the United States to escape poverty and the lack of freedom and opportunities in their home countries, and to make better lives for themselves and their families. And I understand that they may feel somewhat misled by the varying U.S. approaches to immigration enforcement over the last few decades. But the fact remains that, under the laws passed by Congress and the President, they are acting illegally by remaining in the United States—at least unless Congress and the President choose some other legislative approach to legalize some or all of those individuals now illegally present in the country. And by illegally immigrating into and remaining in the country, they are not only violating the immigration laws, but also jumping in front of those noncitizens who follow the rules and wait in line to immigrate into the United States through the legal immigration process. For those reasons, the interests of illegal immigrants in evading questioning (and thus evading detection of their illegal presence) are not particularly substantial as a legal matter.

Moreover, as for stops of those individuals who are legally in the country, the questioning in those circumstances is typically brief, and those individuals may promptly go free after making clear to the immigration officers that they are U.S. citizens or otherwise legally in the United States.

Finally, although the dissent emphasizes the force allegedly used by immigration officers, that is not the issue in this case. The District Court enjoined the Government from stopping individuals for questioning based on several enumerated factors. The injunction is silent as to the use of force. And it is not necessary for the injunction to address that use-of-force question because the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard continues to govern the officers' use of force and to prohibit excessive force.

To the extent that excessive force has been used, the Fourth Amendment prohibits such action, and remedies should be available in federal court. I agree with the dissent on that point. But to reiterate, this injunction against brief stops for questioning does not address the use- of-force issue.

In short, the balance of harms and equities favors the Government here.

Especially in an immigration case like this one, it is also important to stress the proper role of the Judiciary. The Judiciary does not set immigration policy or decide enforcement priorities. It should come as no surprise that some Administrations may be more laissez-faire in enforcing immigration law, and other Administrations more strict. Article III judges may have views on which policy approach is better or fairer. But judges are not appointed to make those policy calls. We merely ensure, in justiciable cases, that the Executive Branch acts within the confines of the Constitution and federal statutes. Just as this Court a few years ago declined to step outside our constitutionally assigned role to improperly compel greater Executive Branch enforcement of the immigration laws, see United States v. Texas, 599 U.S. 670; Biden v. Texas, 597 U.S. 785, we now likewise must decline to step outside our constitutionally assigned role to improperly restrict reasonable Executive Branch enforcement of the immigration laws. Consistency and neutrality are hallmarks of good judging, and in my view, we abide by those enduring judicial values in this case by granting the stay.

In sum, the Government has demonstrated a fair prospect of success on the merits and has met the other factors for an interim stay pending appeal of the District Court's injunction. I therefore vote to grant the Government's application.