Hawaii v. Mankichi

Hawaii v. Mankichi.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Territory of Hawaii.

No. 219. Argued March 4, 5, 1903.—Decided June 1, 1903.

In interpreting a statute the intention of the lawmaking power will prevail even against the letter of the statute; a thing may be within the letter of the statute and not within its meaning, and within its meaning, though not within its letter. Smythe v. Fisk, 23 Wallace 374. In inserting in the Resolution of July 7, 1898, annexing Hawaii, a provision that municipal legislation not inconsistent with the Constitution of the United States should remain in force until Congress otherwise determined, Congress did not intend to impose upon the islands every clause of the Constitution, and to nullify convictions and verdicts which might, before the legislature could act, be rendered in accordance with existing legislation of the islands but not in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, nor was such the intention of Hawaii in surrendering its autonomy.

The conviction of one who, between August 12, 1898, and June 14, 1900, was tried on information and convicted by a jury not unanimous, in accordance with legislation of the Republic of Hawaii existing at the time of the annexation, is legal notwithstanding it is not in compliance with the provisions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments of the Constitution.

This was a petition by Mankichi for a writ of habeas corpus to obtain his release from the Oahu convict prison, where he is confined upon conviction for manslaughter, in alleged violation of the Constitution, in that he was tried upon an indictment not found by a grand jury, and convicted by the verdict of nine out of twelve jurors, the other three dissenting from the verdict.

Following the usual course of procedure in the Republic of Hawaii, prior to its incorporation as a territory of the United States, the prisoner was tried upon an indictment much in the form of an information at common law, by the Attorney General, and endorsed "a true bill found this fourth day of May, A.D. 1899. A. Perry, first judge of the Circuit Court," etc.

From an order of the United States District Court discharging the prisoner, the Attorney General of the territory appealed to this court. . . .

Mr. Justice Brown, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court.

The question involved in this case is an extremely simple one. The difficulty is in fixing upon the principles applicable to its solution. By a joint resolution adopted by Congress, July 7, 1898, 30 Stat. 750, known as the Newlands resolution, and with the consent of the Republic of Hawaii, signified in the manner provided in its constitution, the Hawaiian Islands, and their dependencies, were annexed "as a part of the territory of the United States, and subject to the sovereign dominion thereof," with the following condition: "The municipal legislation of the Hawaiian Islands, not enacted for the fulfillment of the treaties so extinguished, and not inconsistent with this joint resolution nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States nor to any existing treaty of the United States, shall remain in force until the Congress of the United States shall otherwise determine." The material parts of this resolution are printed in the margin. Though the resolution was passed July 7, the formal transfer was not made until August 12, when, at noon of that day, the American flag was raised over the government house, and the islands ceded with appropriate ceremonies to a representative of the United States. Under the conditions named in this resolution the Hawaiian Islands remained under the name of the "Republic of Hawaii" until June 14, 1900,
when they were formally incorporated by act of Congress under the name of the "Territory of Hawaii." 31 Stat. 141. By this act the Constitution was formally extended to these islands, sec. 5, and special provisions made for empanelling grand juries and for unanimous verdicts of petty juries. Sec. 83.

The question is whether, in continuing the municipal legislation of the islands not contrary to the Constitution of the United States, it was intended to abolish at once the criminal procedure theretofore in force upon the islands, and to substitute immediately and without new legislation the common law proceedings by grand and petit jury, which had been held applicable to other organized Territories, Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437; American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343, though we have also held that the States, when once admitted as such, may dispense with grand juries, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516; and perhaps allow verdicts to be rendered by less than a unanimous vote. American Publishing Co. v. Fisher, 166 U.S. 464; Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343. . . .

If the negative words of the resolution, "nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States," be construed as imposing upon the islands every provision of a Constitution, which must have been unfamiliar to a large number of their inhabitants, and for which no previous preparation had been made, the consequences in this particular connection would be that every criminal in the Hawaiian Islands convicted of an infamous offence between August 12, 1898, and June 14, 1900, when the act organizing the territorial government took effect, must be set at large; and every verdict in a civil case rendered by less than a unanimous jury held for naught. Surely such a result could not have been within the contemplation of Congress. It is equally manifest that such could not have been the intention of the Republic of Hawaii in surrendering its autonomy. Until then it was an independent nation, exercising all the powers and prerogatives of complete sovereignty. It certainly could not have anticipated that, in dealing with another independent nation, and yielding up its sovereignty, it had denuded itself, by a negative pregnant, of all power of enforcing its criminal laws according to the methods which had been in vogue for sixty years, and was adopting a new procedure for which it had had no opportunity of making preparation. The legislature of the Republic bad just adjourned, not to convene again until some time in 1900, and not actually convening until 1901. The resolution on its face bears evidence of having been intended merely for a temporary purpose, and to give time to the Republic to adapt itself to such form of territorial government as should afterwards be adopted in its organic act. . . .

It is not intended here to decide that the words "nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States" are meaningless. Clearly they would be operative upon any municipal legislation thereafter adopted, and upon any proceedings thereafter had, when the application of the Constitution would not result in the destruction of existing provisions conducive to the peace and good order of the community. Therefore we should answer without hesitation in the negative the question put by counsel for the petitioner in their brief: "Would municipal statutes of Hawaii, allowing a conviction of treason on circumstantial evidence, or on the testimony of one witness, depriving a person of liberty by the will of the legislature and without process, or confiscating private property for public use without compensation, remain in force after an annexation of the Territory to the United States, which was conditioned upon the extinction of all legislation contrary to the Constitution?" We would even go farther, and say that most, if not all, the privileges and immunities contained in the bill of rights of the Constitution were intended to apply from the moment of annexation; but we place our decision of this case upon the ground that the two rights alleged to be violated in this case are not fundamental in their nature, but concern merely a method of procedure which sixty years of practice had shown to be suited to the conditions of the islands, and well calculated to conserve the rights of their citizens to their lives, their property and their well-being.

Inasmuch as we are of opinion that the status of the islands and the powers of their provisional government were measured by the Newlands resolution, and the case has been argued upon that theory, we have not deemed it necessary to consider what would have been its position had the important words "nor contrary to the Constitution of the United States" been omitted, or to reconsider the questions which arose in the Insular Tariff cases regarding the power of Congress to annex territory without at the same time extending the Constitution over it. Of course, for the reasons already stated, the questions involved in this case could arise only from such as occurred between the taking effect of the joint resolution of July 7, 1898, and the act of April 30, 1900, establishing the territorial government.

The decree of the District Court for the Territory of Hawaii must be reversed, and the case remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the petition. . . .